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COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

TASK FORCE REPORT
ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

APPENDIX II

MAY 1955

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(CLANDESTINE SERVICES)

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REPORT OF SURVEY

of

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(CLANDESTINE SERVICES)

by

HERMAN O. LANE, COLONEL, U.S. ARMY (RETD.)

This report consists of a basic report (3 copies, Nos. 1 to 3 inclusive) of 59 pages and 3 Exhibits, Tabs A to C inclusive. These exhibits, because of their highly sensitive nature, are attached to Copy No. 1 only.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(Clandestine Services)

I GENERAL

a. Authority: When and By Whom Conducted: Purpose

Pursuant to instructions of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government creating a Task Force on Intelligence Activities, a survey of the Clandestine Services of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was conducted during the period 1 November 1954 to 18 March 1955 inclusive, by Colonel Herman O. Lane, U.S. Army (Retired), of Alexandria, Virginia. Due to the extreme sensitivity of the activities and operations of this part of CIA, no assisting personnel were employed, except that an officer on duty with the Plans and Program Coordination Staff, Clandestine Services, CIA, was used extensively as a liaison coordinator, both in the domestic phase of the survey and during the subsequent overseas inspection of European and North African offices and installations of the Agency.

The purpose of the survey was to acquaint the members of the task force with sufficient facts pertinent to and an appraisal of the clandestine activities and operations of CIA, so that they might be able to make suitable report to proper Government officials for the information of the latter and corrective action where indicated.

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b. Scope of Survey

This survey included those elements of CIA engaged in covert activities and operations, plus, in pertinent part, certain overt elements giving active administrative and logistical support thereto. Inspectional visits were made to all covert staff and operational divisions of the Washington headquarters; the clandestine training areas in [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] offices and installations operated under cover in [redacted]

Conferences were held with all responsible staff heads and chiefs of all divisions and branches; with diplomatic and military representatives abroad. Individual employees were interviewed freely on the job and the peculiarities of all phases of daily operation were observed and inquired into. Another group of the task force visited [redacted] 25X1
[redacted]

The surveying officer received everywhere a marked frankness, courtesy, and wholehearted cooperation, and expresses herewith a keen appreciation to the Director, CIA, and the Deputy Director/Plans, CIA, and members of their respective staffs for their personal interest and assistance, office space, transportation, and other services incident to the survey.

II HISTORICAL

Under the provisions of Section 102(f)(2) of the National Security Act of 26 July 1947, CIA took over in the fall of the same year personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), which by this same authority ceased to exist. Included in the organizational

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structure of CIG, as transferred to CIA, was the Office of Special Operations (OSO), at that time a branch of CIG engaged in the covert collection of intelligence and formerly an integral part of the Office of Strategic Services of the World War II period and shortly thereafter. On 12 December 1947, National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 5 charged the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, hereinafter referred to as the DCI, with conducting all Federal espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions, for the collection of foreign intelligence information required to meet the needs of all departments and agencies concerned, and for counter-espionage in occupied areas, except for certain agreed activities by other departments and agencies. This directive served as a basis for continued operation of OSO in the covert field.

During the latter part of 1947, the National Security Council (NSC) held many formal deliberations concerning the desirability and possibility of setting up some kind of agency for conducting covert operations as part of peacetime security measures and in order to combat the efficient and growing cold-war apparatus of the Soviet bloc. The question of location within the Government of such an agency posed a serious problem to the members of NSC and the several committees assigned the task of preparing recommendations in connection therewith. Argument was at first submitted that since the facility proposed was one intended to meet a cold-war need it would, in fact, be an asset of the Department of Defense and should, therefore, be placed under that department. Eventually, however, NSC members came to the opinion, rather, that any agency created for cold-war usage would be political, not military, and since the project

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pertained to our relationship with a foreign power in time of peace, the thinking prevailed that it should become a part of the State Department. The then Secretary of State, General Marshall, objected vigorously to this plan. He pointed out that, although he was sympathetic to the idea of creating the proposed agency, such an activity could not be placed organizationally within the State Department without impairing his ability to make plausible denial of those activities in which the hand of the United States Government must not be seen.

The CIA, in December 1947, had been charged by NSCID No. 5 with conducting espionage and counterespionage operations abroad. This was some six months prior to the final deliberations of NSC on the question of establishing a cold-war agency to cope with the Soviet machinery being used for that purpose. It therefore appeared logical and feasible, following the sustained objections of the Secretary of State, to place the responsibility for covert operations against the Communist bloc within the structure of CIA and to correlate them with espionage and counter-espionage operations already begun by the DCI. The loss of Czechoslovakia to the Iron Curtain orbit and a stepped-up cold-war offensive early in 1948 on the part of the Kremlin and directed against all free peoples of the world hastened the action of NSC to take positive counteractive measures. On 18 June 1948, NSC published NSC Directive 10/2 stating, inter alia, and in effect that the Council, taking cognizance of the vicious covert activities of the USSR, its satellite countries, and Communist groups, had determined that, in the interest of world peace and U.S. national security, the overt foreign activities of the U.S. Government

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must be supplemented by covert operations. This directive, citing the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, set up "in time of peace a new Office of Special Projects" within the CIA "to plan and conduct covert operations; and in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in wartime." The directive further provided that a highly qualified person, to be nominated by the Secretary of State and acceptable to the DCI and approved by NSC, should be appointed as chief of the newly created office; still further, that the chief should report directly to the DCI, and that to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency the Office of Special Projects should operate independently of other components of CIA. In this same document, the DCI was made responsible for:

"(1) Ensuring, through designated representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies and with overt activities. In disagreements arising between the Director of Central Intelligence and the representatives of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense over such plans, the matter shall be referred to the National Security Council for decision.

"(2) Ensuring that plans for wartime covert operations are also drawn up with the assistance of a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are accepted by the latter as being consistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartime military operations.

"(3) Informing through appropriate channels, agencies of the U.S. Government, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives in each area), of such operations as will affect them."

The directive provided that supplemental funds for FY 1949 should be requested immediately, and thereafter operational funds for these purposes would be included in normal CIA budget requests. Lastly, the directive interpreted covert operations as "all activities which are

conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups, but which are so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons, and that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to propaganda, economic warfare, preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures, subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counterespionage, and cover and deception for military objective."

On 23 October 1951, by NSC Directive 10/5, the NSC approved in principle the immediate expansion of the covert organization established by NSC 10/2 and the intensification of covert operations designed to place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power and "contribute to the retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence to limits which no longer constitute a threat to U.S. security"; to orient toward the United States "the peoples and nations of the free world, and increase their capacity and will to resist Soviet domination"; to develop underground resistance forces in strategic areas, "including wherever practicable provision of a base upon which the military may expand these forces" ... "in time of war within active theaters of operation." The responsibility of the DCI was reaffirmed by NSC in this same directive

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and responsibility was given to the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), which will be discussed hereinafter, for:

"a. Determining the desirability and feasibility of programs and of major projects for covert operations formulated by or proposed to the DCI.

"b. Establishing the scope, pace, and timing of covert operations and the allocating of priorities among these operations.

"c. Coordinating action to ensure the provisions of adequate personnel, funds, and logistical and other support to the DCI by the Departments of State and Defense for carrying out any approved program of covert operations."

Lastly, NSC requested the Secretary of Defense to provide adequate means whereby the DCI might be assured of the continuing advice and collaboration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in planning for paramilitary operations during the period of the cold war. On 15 July 1952, the DCI made effective an order for merging OSO and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), as the Office of Special Projects had become known, under a Deputy Director for Plans, hereinafter referred to as the DD/P. This consolidation actually created the Clandestine Services of CIA, sometimes referred to hereinafter as the DD/P Complex.

The foregoing so-called "slant" directives of NSC constituted the basic documents for covert operations for CIA until the publication of NSC Directive 5412 on 15 March 1954. This document, in superseding NSC 10/2 and 10/5, reiterated the background and repeated the salient features of these previous documents, and in further interpretation of cold-war policies to be pursued stated, inter alia:

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"3. The NSC has determined that such covert operations shall to the greatest extent practicable, in light of U.S. and Soviet capabilities and taking into account the risk of war, be designed to:

"a. Create and exploit troublesome problems for International Communism, impair relations between the USSR and Communist China and between them and their satellites, complicate control within the USSR, Communist China and their satellites, and retard the growth of the military and economic potential of the Soviet bloc.

"b. Discredit the prestige and ideology of International Communism, and reduce the strength of its parties and other elements.

"c. Counter any threat of a party of individuals indirectly responsive to Communist control to achieve dominant power in a free-world country.

"d. Reduce International Communist control over any areas of the world.

"....."

NSC 5412 also repeated the responsibilities of the DCI as delegated in NSC 10/2 and 10/5. (NSC 5412 was superseded on 12 March 1955 by NSC 5412/1, which did not alter the text of the former as to cold-war objectives.) It is the present charter of operation for the Clandestine Services of CIA. Since there appears to be no other authoritative document carrying an expressed overall national policy of the United States for prosecution of a cold war, it is submitted that, general as it is in terminology, this directive of the NSC, aimed at a single ideology and primarily at a single aggressor against the peace and security of our nation; namely, the USSR, is serving for the time being as the only published expression of our national cold-war policy. The advisability of creating a more specific, inclusive, and perhaps overt statement of

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such policy is open to serious question, considering the natural aversion of the average American to clandestine methods in peacetime dealing with a foreign power.

As to the legal basis for the creation of the Office of Special Projects; vis., Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act, as quoted in NSC 10/2, this portion of the Act reads as follows:

"(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council -

"(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

Thus, the legal question arises as to the existence of any reasonable degree of relationship of the cold-war operations of CIA, as now being conducted, to "intelligence affecting the national security." As far as CIA is concerned, the Agency is bound by the aforementioned NSC directive and the legality thereof is not questioned by the DCI, particularly since the General Counsel of the Agency has expressed the opinion that the action taken by NSC is in conformity with law. While the surveying officer considers the question moot, it does not appear proper at this time, with extensive world-wide covert operations in being, to make conclusion or recommendation in the matter, particularly in view of the broad powers of the Chief Executive, who is entirely witting to the program. No agency of the Government, except CIA, appears appropriate as an operational host for the Office of Special Projects.

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Conclusion

That the Office of Special Projects -- now a part of the Clandestine Services of CIA -- should be continued as a component of CIA.

III ORGANIZATION

There is attached as Tab A a chart showing the organization of the Clandestine Services of CIA under the Deputy Director for Plans (DD/P). This organizational arrangement, designed for uniformity, efficiency, and maximum administrative control, came into being on 1 March 1955 as result of extensive study and long experience of operation under the various rapidly changing tables of organization necessary to meet the heavy impact placed upon CIA by the cold-war program. The staff and operational organization of the Clandestine Services has not experienced smoothness of function in the past, due partly to an inherent unwieldiness, partly to a serious weakness in the chain of control, and partly to the fact that, from the beginning of cold-war operation, representatives of the Department of State have dictated largely, by direct contacts at low organizational level, the policy and specific operations of CIA in the field of psychological warfare without going through the DCI to do so. This circumstance has often resulted in confusion, loss of administrative control, inefficiency in operation, and sometimes an actual ignorance on the part of responsible CIA officials as to operations being initiated. While both State and CIA have taken recent steps to provide proper liaison channels between their respective agencies, it is considered by the surveying officer that the problem is of sufficient importance to warrant solution by different means, as will be discussed later in this report. Operational control has been adversely affected,

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also, by frequent direct dealings with the Clandestine Services at staff or divisional level on the part of the DCI. It appears that such action has been taken on the grounds of expedition and security. Under the National Security Act of 1947 and NSC directives, the DCI has the sole responsibility for the security of intelligence and cold-war operations, and his actions in such instances undoubtedly were deemed by him to be in the best interest of the Government at the time. These, however, plus the direct lines of area division chiefs of the Clandestine Services to the DCI as his "executives" and to the field, and vice versa, as prescribed by written directive of the DCI dated 15 July 1952 and reiterated in Agency regulations dated 11 March 1955, have been consistently destructive to organizational cohesion and smoothness of operation. Under such system, lacking the mechanism to implement staff guidance, because of the peculiar independence of area division chiefs, the authority of the DD/P over his organization has been reduced below the minimum requirements for control, efficient operation, and even security. NSC 10/2 directed his appointment as "chief of the newly created office." Since July 1952, the DCI has not permitted him to function as such.

Conclusion

That rigid lines of control and staff procedure pertinent to the Clandestine Services should be established within CIA to eliminate the present independence of the area divisional chiefs and overseas elements.

It is considered by the surveying officer that the currently reorganized structure of the Clandestine Services of CIA, while a progressive step, is inadequate in that the entire administrative and

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logistical support of the DD/P Complex under the new organization is now on the overt side of the Agency. As stated previously, NSC 10/2 required that "to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency, the Office of Special Projects should operate independently of other components of CIA." At the time of the beginning of this survey, there was present with the DD/P Complex a small liaison group from each of the major elements of support, although final approval for logistical and administrative assistance rested with the Deputy Director for Administration (now the Deputy Director for Support) located on the overt side of the Agency. Even these groups are now being removed. This cumbersome arrangement has always placed the DD/P in the confusing position of a division combat commander without authority of his own to employ his assets, or to expend his ammunition in engaging targets of opportunity as he sees fit. It has meant further that the DD/P has been denied the convenience of firm logistical planning within the confines of his own and highly sensitive organization; that many of his covert activities requiring support have had to pass through an overt stage prior to final approval; moreover, that it has been by merest chance that many of his operations have not been compromised by having to acquaint a large number of overt personnel of the Agency with the details of such operations in order to obtain administrative and logistical support therefor; that he felt compelled to set up and operate within his organization supplementary branches for all those support elements necessary to the continued existence and operation of his office, such as personnel, training, logistics, etc. Many of these so-called administrative staffs are large. This has been, and under the current organization will continue to be, a

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necessary but wasteful duplication of personnel which might well be eliminated at considerable saving to the Government, were the requirements of NSC 10/2 carried out and the Office of Special Projects, now a part of the Clandestine Services, made completely self-supporting, so as to operate independently of other components of CIA. The surveying officer expresses the strong conviction that this cold-war activity should be entirely divorced from any other component of CIA, with all the present staff duplications eliminated, and finds no reason of efficiency for any other action. Rather, it appears in the interest of both efficiency and economy, as well as to the best interests of the Government security-wise, to place under the Chief of the Office of Special Projects every support element necessary to carry out his mission and insure its success and security in all respects.

Conclusion

That the Office of Special Projects, now a part of the Clandestine Services, should be made entirely self-supporting and be operated independently of other components of CIA, as was the intent of NSC at the time of creation of this cold-war activity.

A study of the organization chart of the DD/P Complex (Tab A) will reflect the world-wide coverage of the Clandestine Services of CIA at the present time. Although there is much still to be accomplished before the Clandestine Services may be said to have come of age, when full consideration be given to the tremendous task so suddenly imposed upon the Agency by the creation of the Office of Special Projects and the relatively short period of its existence it is remarkable that there has been created so quickly and so secretively an activity of this nature, with

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only a token assistance from the other Government agencies or instrumentalities. While most of the mistakes made in the process have been the activity's very own, its successes have likewise been its own and the latter are beginning gradually to far outweigh the former.

IV OPERATIONS

a. Background

Under the provisions of NSC 10/2, as previously discussed in this report, covert operations placed under the responsibility of the DCI were, inter alia, to include:

- (1) Propaganda.
- (2) Economic Warfare.
- (3) Preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition, and evacuation measures.
- (4) Subversion against hostile states, including assistance movements, guerrillas, and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.

From the viewpoint of CIA, NSC 10/2 lacked the element of guidance which would determine the extent of the covert operations to be undertaken and it was not readily foreseeable by CIA officials, or other Government agencies involved, the ends to which the program should be pushed in order to insure winning the cold war for the United States. It soon became apparent to all concerned that the Office of Special Projects was to become a major political instrumentality and must have recognition as such; that freedom of operation must be accorded it far

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beyond that granted by law and regulations applicable to other Government agencies.

NSC 68, published late in 1950, sought to provide a measure of guidance as to the national objectives in the unexplored field of cold war. Its provisions for more rapid build-up of free-world potential, however, were too vague and general to serve effectively its intended purpose. The DCI, on 8 May 1951, therefore, transmitted to NSC a memorandum entitled "Scope and Pace of Covert Operations." In this communication, he depicted the status of covert operations and requested more specific guidance. He pointed out that these operations were outstripping the administrative capabilities of CIA, which were small when compared with the objectives outlined in NSC 68. The question as to the extent to which cold-war activities should be targeted toward counter-revolution in Communist-controlled states was raised. Finally, the DCI recommended a review of covert cold-war operations and a restatement of the responsibilities involved. The result, after months of deliberation at high Government level, was the publication of NSC 10/5, previously discussed in this report, which did little beyond reiterating the provisions of NSC 10/2 and delineating the role of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), which had been created by Presidential directive on 4 April 1951. This action by the Chief Executive had been considered by NSC a constructive step to provide necessary guidance for the activities of the now firmly established Office of Special Projects (known then in CIA as OPC). For reasons not readily apparent from existing records, however, controversy soon arose between PSB and the State Department and the former was never able to perform the functions originally conceived by NSC for it and contributed little in the way of guidance in the

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cold-war effort prior to its abolishment by Executive Order 10483 on 2 September 1953.

The Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), since its creation by this same Executive Order, while approving or disapproving cold-war projects on a national political policy basis, has evidently not sought to make overall interpretations of cold-war policy or strategy; nor does it appear that the order creating the Board intended that it should do so.

In the absence of specific national cold-war strategy, CIA first injected itself on a major scale into the field of covert operations in 1951 in compliance with NSC directives. The onset of the Korean War in 1950 had delayed materially the cold-war program. In June 1951, a strategic plan was completed by CIA and presented to representatives of the State Department, Department of Defense, and JCS, who accepted it with only minor changes. This plan then became the basis for subsequent so-called country plans, which contained estimates of support requirements. By 1952, the Agency was in a position for the first time to present its complete requirements in terms of personnel, budget, materiel, and services for the following two-year period.

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1ST INDORSEMENT

To: The Chairman of the Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Washington 25, D.C. May , 1955

We have reviewed with interest the report of the surveying officer and concur in his recommendations, except for the first recommendation, which is in three parts.

With respect to the excepted recommendation, the most disturbing finding of the task force is that our intelligence community as a whole is not producing enough "raw" intelligence information from behind the Iron Curtain. In plain words, we are not getting the information we need on the plans, actions, and potentialities of Soviet Russia, Communist China, and their neighboring satellites.

Security measures adopted by the Communists have been provokingly conceived and boldly employed. They have been quite effective, in comparison with our security measures, which have permitted the collection of vital secrets in this country with relative ease. The information we need, particularly for our Armed Forces, is potentially available. Through concentration on the prime target, we can and must get it. Success in this field depends on greater boldness at the policy level, a willingness to accept certain calculated political and diplomatic risks, and full use of technological capabilities.

The CIA has been charged by the NSC with the general responsibility for collecting foreign intelligence. Unfortunately, organizational weaknesses and lack of proper directional control and persistence in execution of a well-planned program for this purpose have militated

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against the measure of success which might reasonably be expected from the personnel and financial assets possessed by CIA.

A majority of the task force members further believe that those elements of the current Deputy Director of Plans area of responsibility that are now engaged in the covert collection of foreign intelligence should be removed from close integration with the "cold-war" elements of that responsibility, and that the covert intelligence and cold-war functions of that area each be assigned to the exclusive jurisdictional control of a separate Deputy Director of Intelligence, with the area of responsibility of each made administratively and logistically self-supporting. However, a minority of the task force feels that both covert intelligence and cold-war operations should be under both the staff and operating control of a single director, but with two deputy directors at staff level to handle these two functions separately and exclusively.

The task force also is of the opinion that the Director of Central Intelligence should reestablish the office of the Executive Director of the Agency, so that the DCI may be relieved of the chore of many day-to-day administrative and operational problems, and thus be able to give more time to the broad overall direction of the Agency.

Accordingly, the task force makes the following recommendation, in lieu of the initial recommendation of the surveying officer:

THAT THE "COVERT INTELLIGENCE" FUNCTIONS AND THE "COLD-WAR" FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PLANS AREA IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EACH BE ASSIGNED TO THE JURISDICTIONAL CONTROL OF A SEPARATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF EACH OF WHOM SHALL BE MADE ADMINISTRATIVELY AND LOGISTICALLY SELF-SUPPORTING; AND

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THAT THE PART OF THE AGENCY DIRECTIVE OF JULY 15, 1952,
APPOINTING THE AREA DIVISIONAL CHIEFS AS EXECUTIVES OF THE DCI
AND PROVIDING FOR THEIR DIRECT DEALINGS WITH HIM AND SENIOR
OVERSEAS REPRESENTATIVES BE RESCINDED; AND

THAT THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE REESTABLISH THE
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THAT AGENCY.

As thus amended, the task force concurs in the recommendations of
the surveying officer.

MARK W. CLARK, Chairman
Task Force on Intelligence Activities

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